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observed,

1.

Writing half a century ago, Kenneth Burke argued
that to one degree or another all persuasive discourse
obeys a "principle of courtship” whose purpose lies in
“the transcending of social estrangement” (208). As
Burke explains this principle,
[i]n its essence communication involves the use
of verbal symbols for purposes of appeal. Thus it
splits formally into the three elements of speak
er, speech, and spoken-to, with the speaker so
shaping his speech as to “commune” with the
spoken-to. This purely technical pattern is the
precondition of all appeal. And “standoffishness”
is necessary to the form, because without it the
appeal could not be maintained.. . . Rhetorically,
there can be courtship only insofar as there is
division. (271)

Burke identifies this primordial and self-sustaining
“standoffishness” — which corresponds roughly to
the notion of desire in Lacanian psychoanalysis and
to that of différance in Derridean theory1 — as a
defining element of “pure persuasion” (269) and as an
irreducible quality of self-interference present to
degree or another within all rhetorical performance.
No major work of English literature better exem
plifies the courtship-function of rhetorical
than does Shakespeare’s Othello. As Alan Sinfield,
one, has
the play’s “action advances
through a contest of stories” (30) whereby Iago’s tale
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of adultery undoes what Othello’s tales of travel and heroism have achieved for
him. Thus, although Othellos preoccupation with narrativity has been estab
lished by a number of previous critics,2 I would like to reexamine it in light of
Burke’s analysis and the concept of “standoffishness” that grounds it. My points
in conducting this examination are three. First, I believe that if Othello com
prises an extended act of courtship, the self-interference intrinsic to that
is
concentrated disproportionately within a single dramatic role: that of Iago.
Second, I would note that, in his capacity as the principle of rhetorical self
interference incarnate, Iago repeatedly conceives the
of union as a violation
of perceptual categories: not only those of race and nationality but also of rank
and gender and ultimately of species itself. In terms of this latter point, it
would be easy to see Iago’s obsession with violated boundaries as voicing a gen
eralized anxiety over the collapse of social
in which case Othello begs
to be
in Burke’s phrase, as a document of “‘social lewdness’ mythically
expressed in sexual terms” (208). However — and this is my third and final
point — the interest in crossing lines is not Iago’s alone, and when it appears in
the language of other characters it figures not so much as a transgression to be
shunned but rather as a consummation to be wished. To this extent, it embod
ies a rhetorical impulse for the elucidation of which we must look beyond the
work of Kenneth Burke to the more recent theoretical writings of Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, where it surfaces as the principle of deterritorialization.

2.
In a reading of Othello that figured, on its first appearance, as
of the foun
dational documents of the New Historicism, Stephen Greenblatt has drawn
notice to the play’s “ceaseless narrative invention” (235), an invention that tends
both to convert eros to storytelling and to translate storytelling into eros.
Greenblatt, Othellos characters “have always already submitted to narrativity”
(237), and thus the tale of Othello’s doomed love for Desdemona is, among
other things, also the tale of Desdemona’s love for the tale of Othello’s life.
Othello himself narrates matters as follows, nesting the story of his life within
the story of
love within the scene of his trial within the play of his undoing:
I spoke of most disastrous chances:
Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hair-breadth scapes i’ th’ imminent deadly breach,
Of being taken by the insolent foe
And sold to slavery, of my redemption thence
And portance in my [travel’s] history;

These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline;
But still the house affairs would draw her thence,
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch,
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She’ld come again, and with a greedy ear
Devour up my discourse. (1.3.134-9, 145-50)

This passage gives us Burke’s principle of courtship in triplicate, at least:
Shakespeare woos
Globe audience with the tale of Othello, in which Oth
ello woos another audience — the Venetian senate — with the tale of Othello
woofrig yet another audience — Desdemona — with the tale of Othello. Nor
is Desdemona the only character to experience the erotic pull of this overdeter
mined narrativity; as the Duke observes of the Moor’s performance, “I think
this tale would win my daughter too” (1.3.171). The express tendency of the
narrative drive in this scene is toward a union simultaneously rhetorical and
erotic in character. Thus when Othello reaches out to the Venetian senate by
recapitulating his act of outreach to Desdemona, readers and viewers of Shake
’s play, too, participate in a pattern of storytelling superimposed upon
itself, reencountering itself in different settings so that the very act of listening
to the Moor’s tale becomes an act of structural communion with other listeners
in other contexts, all of whom seem to repeat the originary model of Desde
mona, devouring up Othello’s discourse.
I say that this structural repetition seems to originate with Desdemona, but
in truth it does not. In
Desdemona’s role as Othello’s archetypal audience
derives from yet another, prior model: the aggrieved Brabantio himself. Again,
Othello’s account of his love for Desdemona provides the central evidence here:
Her father lov’
oft invited me;
Still question’ me the story of my life
From
to
— the [battles], sieges, [fortunes],
That I have pass’d.
These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline.
(1.3.128-31,145-6; emphasis added)

This storytelling, the
and extension of Brabantio’s “love” for Othello,
becomes in turn the catalyst, extension, and — as Desdemona plucks up her
spirits and asks Othello to tell more stories directly to her (150-5) —
of
Desdemona’s love for the same man. The storytelling-relation-that-is-also-alove-relation is apparently no respecter of genders; developing between men, it
simply reimprints itself within the dynamic of heterosexual courtship before
transferring itself, in further turn, to the legal context of Othello’s trial and to
the theatrical context of Shakespeare’s play. The result is a kind of courtship
one cannot adequately
in terms of the masculine homosocial dynamic
that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and others have viewed as exemplary of much
Shakespearean love-discourse. In that dynamic women tend to serve as the
markers of a prior and supervening attachment between men,3 but for Othello
the attachment is not so easily stratified into the relation of privileged signified
(a man’s love for another man) and subordinate signifier (a man’s relation to a
woman related to a beloved man). Rather than standing for Brabantio, Desde
mona in an important sense becomes him.
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In doing so, I would argue, she threatens to attain the condition of absolute
communion that comprises the ideal end of Othellos rhetoric: a condition in
which fathers and daughters, senators and groundlings, tales and their innu
merable retellings all coalesce, achieving a polymorphous reciprocity — per
haps, given the erotic nature of Othello’s storytelling, even a polymorphous
perversity — that nullifies the social and psychic divisions presupposed
the
rhetoric itself. This condition especially transcends the fundamental distinc
tion between speaker and auditor, a point manifest in Desdemona’s response to
Othello’s tale:
She swore, in faith ’twas strange, ’twas passing strange,
’Twas pitiful, ’twas wondrous pitiful.
She wish’d she had not heard it, yet she wish’
That heaven had made her such a man. (160-3)
The line “she wish’d / That heaven had made her such a man,” with its famous
syntactical ambiguity, points toward the dissolution of personhood that results
from successful rhetoric and successful courtship. Poised against the possibili
ty that heaven might indeed make Desdemona such a man — in one sense of
the phrase or another — is Desdemona’s own unwillingness to hear a story that
is difficult to endure precisely because it assails the bounds of her being. As
Burke has remarked, there can only be courtship so long as there is division.
Desdemona’s reluctance to hear the story that fascinates her serves simultane
ously to register the attraction of the promised communion and the anxiety that
it provokes.
Yet it is in the figure of Iago that this anxiety takes up particular residence,
with the result that Iago initiates the dominant counter-movement of Shake
speare’s play: a concerted pattern of resistance to the principle of communion
exemplified by Othello’s rhetoric. At bottom, it is Iago’s job to sustain division,
and by sustaining it to sustain all the varied rhetorical operations — the innu
merable acts of courtship and appeal and solicitation — that presuppose
Thus, where Othello’s storytelling
a primary moment of conjunction
whereby father and daughter, Brabantio and Desdemona, achieve equivalence
in their relation to the Moor, Iago nurtures a sense of loss:

Awake! what ho, Brabantio! thieves, thieves!
Look to your house, your daughter, and your bags! (1.1.79-80)
And again,

[’Zounds], sir, y’are robb’d! For shame, put on your gown;
Your heart is burst, you have lost half your soul. (86-7)
And later, employing the same pattern of imagery to arouse jealousy in Othel
lo:
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he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed. (3.3.159-61)
Iago’s fascination with money, with getting it and spending it and hoarding
it and stealing it, is of course a staple of
character. My point here is that
this fascination
more than material profit and loss; it registers linguis
tic loss as well, a linguistic loss well represented by the theft of one’s “good
name.” Moreover, once it is abstracted from particular material transactions
and contexts, the preoccupation with what is missing informs Iago’s behavior
on a grand scale. For instance, recent scholars in queer theory have rightly cau
tioned us not to read
modern literary documents as expressive of a bina
rized economy of heterosexual and homosexual desire, an
that it is
anachronistic
ascribe to early modern sexual thought and social practice;4
yet, in an almost uncannily prophetic way, Iago himself
just this sort
of binary impulse by organizing the personal relationships of Shakespeare’s play
according to the laws of urinary segregation. He gets along famously with men,
after all, and his facility in managing Roderigo and
and Brabantio and
Othello contrasts both against
invidious, highly charged relations with Des
demona and Emilia and against Othello’s initial solidarity with Desdemona. In
effect, Othello’s belief in the existence of a fictive love triangle between him
self, Desdemona, and Cassio serves as the ex postfacto expression of a real, pre
existent triangle between Iago, Othello, and Desdemona. This latter triangle,
in turn, receives double consecration in Othello’s holy union with Desdemona
and in the “sacred vow” (3.3.461) with which Othello and Iago later seal their
confederacy. This vow, almost a homoerotic betrothal ceremony,5 renders the
binarisms of Iago’s character into a structural principle of Shakespeare’s play;
Othello may either choose his wife or his ancient, his woman or his man. In
either case, gain goes hand in hand with loss.
Nor does Iago’s preoccupation with loss confine itself to questions of gen
der; it operates
on the level of genre, where Iago’s language displays a
clear preference for certain modes of articulation, certain speech acts. Although
Greenblatt has viewed Iago’s
as a kind of “narrative fashioning” that
extends and recapitulates the narrative preoccupations of other figures (237),
one remarkable feature of Iago’s character is the way in which it stakes out pet
modes of expression distinct from those of other characters, particularly Othel
lo. Thus, where Othello tells tales and gives commands, Iago offers advice,
solicits advancement (or complains about its absence), issues warnings, and
negotiates agreements. These latter are all classic
of courtship, in
Burke’s sense of the term, and of courtiership as well; thus they are appropriate
to a figure who inhabits a divided world, who fraternizes mostly with men, and
with men whose interaction is governed by intricately devised systems of mili
tary and courtly rank and protocol. In any case, Iago’s language is populated by
signature gestures of appeal and solicitation, beginning with
first long
speech (“Why, there’s no remedy. ’Tis the curse of service; / Preferment goes
by letter and
” [1.1.34-5]); continuing through his cultivation of
Roderigo (“I hate the Moor. . . . Let us be conjunctive in our revenge against
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him” [1.3.366,367-8]); and extending ultimately to his successful temptation of
Othello himself (“You would
satisfied? . . . / Would you, the [supervisor],
grossly gape on?” [3.3.393,395]). In
where Othello says “Let me tell you
a story,” Iago says “Let me make you a deal.”
This discursive preference, in turn, entails certain consequences on the level
of character. With his repeated petitions and promises and offers and incen
tives, Iago displays certain
for the “comedy of non-interaction” that
Gabriele Jackson has identified in Ben Jonsons early work (1). For Jackson, the
characters of Jonsonian comedy are “sundered from the outside world by urgent
attention to an inner clamor” (26); they ricochet off of one another like billiard
balls while in pursuit of the idiosyncratic obsessions that define them. As for
Iago, a similar dynamic invests his dealings with others, since those dealings are
consistently predicated upon the furthering of individual suits. Whether the
suit in question is Iago’s own (his
quest for military promotion; his suc
cessful quest for revenge) or someone else’s project pursued with his encour
agement (Roderigo’s effort to seduce Desdemona; Brabantio’s
action
against Othello; Cassio’s petition to Desdemona for aid in regaining
lieu
tenancy), the dramatic actions associated with Iago are all of a piece,
the pursuit of an idée fixe under whose influence the suitor in question some
how loses the ability to communicate with others. Even Iago himself, whose
capacity to recognize and capitalize upon the obsessions of others is of course
formidable, seems unable, in the end, to understand that his wife might find his bodies,
or
ainy intolerable;
lapse in judgment.
For the suit we
to least, a major
be this is, at the
advantage,
or entangled in a project of the sort encouraged by Iago, the project itself
becomes a means of establishing and maintaining a certain personal distance,
and once again, that distance is the very sort without which rhetoric as
courtship would
unthinkable.
To this extent,
may in fact regard Othello and Iago as complementary
expressions of the two contradictory imperatives that invest and sustain rhetoric
according to Burke’s formulation of the matter. On one hand, Othello embod
ies the impulse to commune, unite, to extend and escape the self in ways that
ultimately entail a rewriting and eventually an unwriting of personal identity.
On the other hand, Iago exists to keep the self — and selfhood — intact; he
employs language to maneuver for personal
and he does so by gen
erating and exploiting various kinds of misunderstanding. Indeed, Iago’s dis
cursive habits are almost a parody of Othello’s. The Moor’s stories change their
audience by enforcing an exchange of identities, a kind of cross-pollination
whereby speaker and listeners enter and inform one another; Iago’s plots and
agreements, conversely, are founded upon the illusion of exchange, upon the
hearer’s misguided apprehension that there has been a meeting of minds where
none has actually occurred. As for the idea that minds —
or selves
— might actually achieve a state of dynamic mutuality, Iago has a notorious
way of imaging this possibility, and it is to this pattern of imagery that I now
turn.
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3.

In his compendious Institutes of the Laws of England, Edward Coke concludes
his brief discussion of the
of buggery by noting that this “detestable and
abominable sin” (sig. I3v) was first criminalized during the reign of Henry VIIL
Uncharacteristically, Coke explains the Henrician anti-buggery statute via
anecdote; it was formulated, he observes, because “a great Lady had committed
Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it, etc.” (sig. I4r). Coke does not
name
source for this story, and its concluding “etc.,” suggesting both the
inevitable and the unimaginable, equally tantalizes and infuriates. From the
late-twentieth-century standpoint, of course, the monstrous birth that Coke
describes is a biological impossibility, and yet its very factitiousness renders it
all the more unnerving. A narrative invention that exceeds the possibilities of
the world as we know it, Coke’s baboon-child simultaneously embodies a social
regime’s anxieties about transgression of the order of nature and figures forth
the unselfconscious determination of that same regime to transgress the nature
that grounds its anxiety.
As for the anxiety itself, I have already argued that Iago lends concerted
expression to something very similar: an obsessive concern with the possible
loss of the self
the language that subtends a concern represented in large
part through febrile fantasies of gender- and race- and species-mixing. These
last are perhaps Iago’s most notorious turns of phrase, and they draw upon the
same
and the same patterns of thought that inform Coke’s baboon
anecdote. For Iago, the miscegenous lovemaking of Othello and Desdemona
threatens to produce just the same sort of denatured conception; being “cover’d
with a Barbary horse” (1.1.111-2), Desdemona will become the dam to a brood
of centaurs; Brabantio
“have coursers for cousins, and gennets for germans”
(113), and the scions of his house will not speak but neigh. Such stuff owes its
origin to a twofold discursive tradition: on one hand a pattern of legal and the
ological thinking (exemplified by Coke, among others) that conceives various
sexual conjunctions as socially and morally objectionable because they violate a
variously conceived order of nature, and
the other hand a
discourse
(well represented by the obstetrical texts of Ambroise Paré)6 that purports to
document the monstrous results of such unnatural unions (see figure 1). Work
ing with the two separate but interrelated strands of this tradition, Iago can
Figure 1. Figure of a colt with a
mans face, from Ambroise Pare,
On Monsters and Marvels 6.
Cf. Othello 1.1.111-3: “You’
have your daughter cover’d with
a Barbary horse, you’ll have
your nephews neigh to you;
you’ll have
for cousins,
and gennets for germans.”
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even read the medical discourse of obstetrical mon
strosity proleptically into the act of “unnatural”
procreation itself; that is the point of his famous
euphemism for sex, “making the beast with two
backs” (1.1.116-7; cf. figure 2), for this compact
and poisonous description endows the lovemaking
of Othello and Desdemona with a deformity pre
figuring that of the equine offspring the lovemak
ing will purportedly produce.
To this extent, Iagos
upon a medicojuridical vocabulary of sexual monstrosity may even
foreshadow the later development of a Foucauldian
scientia sexualis, the vast disciplinary project — of
transforming sex into an object of dispassionate
scientific observation — that Foucault found to be
characteristic of western societies from the eigh
teenth century onward.7 As Jurgis Baltrusaitis has
demonstrated, the teratology of authors like Paré
derives from a medieval mode of “réalisme fantas
tique” supplemented by Teveil d’
pensée réal
iste” (331), and this particular discursive quality,
the very concern for professional observation and
documentation that distinguishes Iago’s source
Figure 2. Figure of two twins
material from Othello’s, allies the former with an
having only one head from
emergent scientific discourse of undeniable power
Pare' 15. Compare Othello
prestige. In his meditation
 upon the social
1.1.115-7: “Your daughter
constructedness of sexuality, Foucault contrasted
and the Moor are now makthis western scientia sexualis with an eastern ars
ing the beast with two backs.
erotica exemplified by sex treatises such as the
Kama Sutra (57-8), and it would be tempting to
discover a similar opposition in Othello. However,
what Shakespeare gives us is less an ars erotica than an eroticized ars narrandi,
through which Othello, too, like Iago, can activate a
of physical
monstrosity:

of antres vast and deserts idle,
Rough quarries, rocks, [and] hills whose [heads] touch heaven,
It was my hint to speak — such was my process
And of the Cannibals that each [other] eat,
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
[Do grow] beneath their
(1.3.140-5)
As Lisa Hopkins has recently noted, Othello’s character “is inserted into
pre-existing discourses of travel that must radically inform and structure his
ostensibly experiential account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his story, it in
fact tells him” (163). Yet, as I have just pointed out, one may say precisely the
same thing about Iago. Ultimately what separates Othello from Iago in this
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respect is not so much
their subjection to
narrativity but rather
the precise kind of
narrativity to which
they are subject; Oth
ello’s monsters remain
distinct from Iago’s,
both with regard to
their ontological sta
tus and their literary
antecedents. As to
the latter of these
points, Othello clear
ly draws upon differ
ent source material
than does his ancient:
not the discourse of
medical abnormality Figure 3. Figure of a female monster without a head, front and back
views, from Paré 36. This illustration may be viewed as a
(cf. figure 3) and thepathologized counterinstance of Othello’s “men whose heads /
ologico-judicial cen
sure, but rather that of [Do grow] beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5).
the medieval travel
ogue and bestiary tradition. Moreover, this preference for certain kinds of
source matter has broad implications for the nature of monstrosity itself, which
emerges in Othello’s language not as an index of individual depravity and per
version but as an emblem of the breadth and diversity of creation. Where
Iago’s monsters narrow the world — dividing it into the familiar and the per
verse, the former to be protected and the latter to
eradicated — Othello’s
monsters widen it, attesting to the lure of the exotic as well as to Othello’s own
ability to render the fantastic accessible. To this extent Othello’s handkerchief
is like his Anthropophagi — a narrative construct whose strangeness carries
with it a charge of erotic fascination even as it conflates the fabulous with the
quotidian:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost read
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
Entirely to her love. . . .
[T] here’s magic in the web of it.
A sibyl, that had numb’red in the world
The sun course two hundred compasses,
In her prophetic fury
’d the work;
The worms were hallowed that did breed the silk,
And it was dy’d in mummy which the skillful
Conserv’d of maiden’s hearts. (3.4.55-60, 69-75)
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Again here, as in his speech to the Venetian senate, Othello uses the story
telling function to collapse distances and elide contexts. The gift of Othello’s
handkerchief is in part the gift of its story, which in turn is the story of its gift,
from sibyl to Egyptian charmer to Othello’s mother to Othello’s father to Oth
ello himself to Desdemona, the story of this gift ending with the gift’s origins
and being entirely prefigured in the “prophetic fury” of the sibyl’s work, which
in turn is repeated within the myriad retellings of the tale it has itself antici
pated. Likewise, Othello’s storytelling once again draws upon particular
sources, its evocation of Egypt and enchantment
the “mummy” drawn from
maiden’s hearts all suggesting that great original of western travel writers,
Herodotus, and the tradition of
and romance descending from his
work. In the case of Othello’s handkerchief-narrative, the nature of the story
telling has shifted a bit; it has begun to assume a threatening cast, not
inviting Desdemona to identify with it but also browbeating her for not having
identified with it closely enough. This fact may in itself bear witness to the
strain under which Othello’s narrative invention has been placed by Iago’s
insinuations, but it also attests to the extraordinary quality of the
itself. Othello’s tale may attach
impossibly heavy weight of meaning to
something as common and trivial as a handkerchief, but that, in a sense, is Oth
ello’s fonction as a dramatic character: to transform everything into a kind of
thick description. His signature gestures — the characteristic recourse to a nar
rative function that conflates disparate times and places and people by giving
them common
endlessly recursive roles within the narrative itself; the
reliance upon a literary tradition grounded in catalogues of marvels such as
those assembled by the travelogue writer and the bestiarist; and the tendency to
dwell upon tales of the strange, wondrous, and marvelous in such a way as to
render them attractively exotic rather than repulsively unnatural — all of these
combine to produce a particular rhetorical effect, an unusually powerful drive
toward what Burke has called “the transcending of social estrangement.”
In the final section of this essay, I will try to characterize the apparent
objective of this rhetorical function more precisely,
to do so I must move
beyond the rhetorical analysis of Burke to a more recent theoretical vocabulary,
developed by Deleuze and Guattari specifically provide a means of thinking
beyond the construction of individual character and personal identity.
4.
Unlike Burke, whose concerns lie mostly with the form and nature of rhetoric
as it is, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seek to theorize an alternative to the
social relations that make such rhetoric possible. If Burke views “standoffishness” as a precondition of all linguistic appeal, Deleuzian analysis might well
argue that that is because Burke describes language as a product of “state phi
losophy” (Thousand Plateaus xi): that is, as a structure of meaning predicated
upon the unity
self-identity of “the thinking subject,” an identity that is
recapitulated in the concepts the subject creates “and which it lends its own
presumed attributes of sameness and constancy” {Thousand Plateaus xi). In
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short, if language nourishes an irreducible alienation of the speaking subject,
that is because language itself is first and foremost not a
of “transcend
ing social estrangement” (this being only a secondary and incidental effect of
linguistic appeal) but in fact a means of fabricating the unitary “I.” For any sub
ject operating in the world of Burkean rhetoric, ego-construction is the first —
and last — order of
its primacy
confirmed by the rhetorical
drive to overcome the alienation that defines it.
But might it be possible
deploy language so that it does not “immure
itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority” (Thousand Plateaus xii)? Could
one remove the principle of standoffishness from its position as simultaneous
ly the motivating force and the preeminent product of semiotic exchange? To
do so, Deleuze
Guattari argue, one must re-theorize identity and its rela
tion to linguistic expression, a relation whose traditional commitment to ideas
of interiority is signaled by the etymology of the word “expression” itself (from
exprimere, literally “to press out”). The challenge here is to rethink the
as a multiple and mutable construct, formulated through relations of externali
ty and through a logic of metonymy rather than metaphor. Deleuze and Guat
tari thus lend particular privilege to tropes of flight and escape, both literal and
openness
ive,
that lead from an ordered
therefore restrictivebeindex
center and
a variit,
in 
to conceived outside. In Deleuzian terminology, the ordered center comes
ously
be known as a “territory”: that is, an enclosed material or biological or spa
tial or linguistic or conceptual space to which have been assigned particular
structural principles and qualities (of identity, property, value, etcetera). The
practice of flight from such enclosures, on the other hand, is what Deleuze and
Guattari call “deterritorialization.” In the last few pages of this essay, I would
like to suggest that the latter concept offers a useful way of understanding Oth
ello’s approach to narrative, which is more complex than standard alienation
based semiotic models give it credit for being.8
In one sense, Othello’s commitment to patterns of exteriority is obvious
enough. He is, as Iago notes, “of a free and open nature” (1.3.399),
this
contrasts markedly with Iago’s guardedness and duplicity. What one
sees of Othello is what one gets, up to and including a physical blackness sur
prisingly free from any pejorative significance as an external
of personal
character or racial inclination. (As Janet Adelman has recently demonstrated,
the pejorative racial associations in Shakespeare’s play originate with Iago, for
whom they externalize a sense of inward deficiency that can
well accounted
for by object-relations psychology.)9 In effect, the story of Othello’s downfall
is the story of how he loses this exteriorized sense of self, exchanging it for the
paradigm of self-division that informs Iago’s character. As Hopkins has put
Iago “is able to effect a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative expecta
tion” (168). The end result of this shift is that Othello and Desdemona engage
in a pattern of sustained misunderstanding, recently traced by Harry Berger, Jr.
(“Trifling” passim), whereby they conspire to lose — and then to forget that
they have conspired to lose — Desdemona’s handkerchief. To this extent, Iago
manages to install a kind of linguistic self-interference in Othello’s and Desde
mona’s relationship; he makes their own words conspirators against them.
But as far as Othello’s own instincts are concerned, signs are not separate
from subjects, nor signifiers from signifieds: instead, “signs are "embedded’
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situations, not fully separated from bodies, specific places, rituals, gestures, sto
ries, etcetera, yet not entirely fixed in their relationship to one another” (Bogue
98). Again, Desdemonas handkerchief offers an outstanding case in point. On
one hand, its
is inextricable from the bodies, places, and rituals
with which it is associated, yet at the same time those bodies, places, and ritu
als shift place in and through and around each other. Thus, for
thing, it
becomes naggingly difficult to track the feminine pronoun references in Othel
lo's description of the handkerchief:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
Entirely to her love . . . (3.4.55-60)

This peculiar array of linguistic shifters
to fix the meaning of the
handkerchief by attaching a massive weight of personal importance to it. Yet
at the same time, Othellos language generates this personal importance not out
of a single, singular individual, but rather out of an accumulated weight of per
sons, so that the final feminine pronoun in this same passage (72), amazingly,
refers neither to Othello’s mother nor to the “Egyptian charmer,” but to the
“sibyl” who sewed the handkerchief that the charmer gave to Othello’s mother.
Thus it is perhaps an appropriate final
that when Othello mentions the
handkerchief again, its meaning remains the same — it is a love token whose
loss represents the loss of love itself — but its history has been revised via an
entirely different set of personal associations: “It was a handkerchief, an
antique token / My father gave my mother” (5.2.216-7).
In cases such as this, narrative representation works for Othello much as it
does in the Deleuzian account of signification in primitive communities. Oth
ello’s tale proceeds collectively and extra-personally,
lines of transfer
which individual bodies are important precisely insofar as they can stand in and
for one another. As Deleuze and Guattari observe,
A Gourma story begins: “When the mouth was dead, the other parts of
the body were consulted to see which of them would take charge of the
burial. . . .” The unities in question are never found persons, but rather
in series which determine the connection, disjunctions, and conjunctions of
organs. (Anti-0edipus 142)

This sort of relation, which Deleuze and Guattari term “plurivocal,” character
izes primitive modes of representation in which the body stands first and fore
most as “a part of the earth” upon which various situationally specific marks of
relation and alliance may be coded. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari argue,
“Our modern societies have undertaken a
privatization of the organs” (1423), a privatization of which I consider Iago to be an outstanding dramatic rep
resentative.
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Again, one may liken the effect of Othello’s storytelling to a classic exam
ple of deterritorialization drawn from the field of biology. Deleuze and Guattari point out that certain tropical wasps and
formulate a symbiotic
relationship that also involves an element of physical mimicry (Thousand
Plateaus 10 [see figure 4]). What distinguishes this relationship, however, is not
so much the obvious quality of physical resemblance but rather the symbiosis
that the resemblance renders visual; the wasp, feeding upon the orchid, trans
fers pollen that reproduces the plant, while the plant, propagating itself through
the transfer of pollen, yields life-sustaining nectar to the wasp. The mimicry in
this relationship is neither a cause nor an effect nor a vehicle of the symbiosis;
wasps can pollinate flowers without looking like them, and flowers can nourish
wasps without looking like them. What seems to be enacted in this particular
case, thus, is not a simple relation of interdependence, nor a simple relation of
mimicry, but something more complex: a moment in which the wasp becomes
an orchid, completing the orchid’s reproductive cycle and entering into an asso
ciation of physical resemblance, just as the orchid performs a reciprocal
of
becoming-wasp. As Deleuze and Guattari comment upon such cases, “A
becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resem
blance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. . . . We fall into a false
alternative if we say that you
either imitate or you are.
What is real is the becoming
itself. . . , not the supposedly
fixed terms through which
that which
passes”
(237-8).
If nothing else, Deleuze
and Guattari’s model of sym
biotic transformation affords
us a
perspective on the
Moor’s intimacy with Desde
That relationship is
founded, after all, upon the
linguistic complementarity of
husband and wife; Desde
mona wishes “[t]hat heaven
had made her such a man” as Figure 4. Wasp-orchid rhizome. Comme des Garçons.
Othello (1.3.162), thus locat
ing herself within a process of becoming-Othello to which the Moor himself
contributes in describing her as his “fair warrior”
(As Iago observes
with disapproval, “Our general’s wife is now the general” [2.3.315-6]). More
over, such language points to the very literal deterritorialization of space —
of personal relation to space — that accompanies Desdemona’s elopement. For
not only does marriage translate Desdemona out of the protective enclosure of
her father’s
and into the midst of a military campaign upon foreign soil;
it also alters her scripted relation to the space she inhabits. Hence her initial
encounters with Othello are constrained by her obligation to perform house
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work — “Still the house affairs would draw her thence, / Which ever as she
could with haste dispatch, / She’d come again
with a greedy ear / Devour
up my discourse” (1.3.147-50) — while her personal role
Cyprus, on the
contrary, is most prominently distinguished by her vigorous intercessions on
behalf of Cassio. This substitution of outside for inside, of foreign ground for
homeland, and of military command decisions for household chores involves an
escape from concurrently encoded, mutually reinforcing notions of domestic
and national and sexual and vocational territory, and to this extent it may easi
ly
described in terms of Deleuzian lines of
If her relationship with Othello offers Desdemona a way out of social and
spatial confinement, in turn, that is because the storytelling function of Othel
lo’s character offers her a line of flight of a particularly far-reaching variety: a
of “transcending social estrangement” that reconfigures the selves who
participate in it, rather than simply reinforcing a defensive alienation coexten
sive with the signifying process itself. In short, for Othello and Desdemona
there seems to be something consciousness-altering about the business of
telling stories: something expansive and liberating and capable of reconfigur
ing the terms within which one experiences the world. It is not my purpose
here argue that Othello’s narrative gift necessarily affects a theater audience
in similar fashion, but it is certainly worth considering the circumstances under
which a dramatist could invest the telling of tales with the peculiar rhetorical
properties that it clearly possesses for Shakespeare’s tragedy. At the least, such
circumstances may say something about how narrativity could be theorized —
and perhaps even experienced — in the Jacobean theater.
In the first instance, then, we may recall that Othello’s stories, with their
propensity to
time and space, repeat the signature gestures of Shake
spearean metatheatrical discourse. From Henry V’s rhetorical question, “Can
this cockpit hold / The vasty fields of France?” (Prologue. 11-12) to Peter
Quince’s claim in A Midsummer Night's Dream that “This green plot shall be
stage, this hawthorn-brake our tiring-house” (3.1.3-4), Shakespeare’s dramatic
technique famously superimposes the foreign ground of fictional narrative upon
a fundamentally bare theatrical space. This theatrical space, in turn, drew its
audience appeal from linguistic representation to a degree that twentieth-cen
tury readers and playgoers, accustomed as we are to different conventions of
dramatic performance, may easily underestimate; as Stephen Orgel has noted,
“[t]heater in 1605 was assumed to be a verbal medium. And acting . . . was a
form of oratory” (16-17). This fact, in turn, implies a particularly tight homol
ogy between Othello’s narrative performances for Desdemona, Brabantio,
etcetera and the narrative performances that were the stock in trade of the
Shakespearean public theater. Thus, developing within a social context in
which its closest analogues and (to the disgust of antitheatrical Puritans) com
petitors for audience attention included such spoken-word media as preaching,
ballad singing, and secular oratory, Shakespeare’s theater discovers its own dou
in the character of Othello. A Deleuzian model of deterritorialization may
thus expand our understanding of how the Renaissance theater could be intu
itively apprehended by its writers and actors
possibly even some of its view
ers.
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In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming may hold
implications not only for the dramatic relationship between Othello and Des
demona but also for the practical relationship between the forms and the
objects of Shakespearean theatrical representation. To think of storytelling as
a process of becoming is, given the predominantly linguistic nature of the
Renaissance public theater, to suggest that we may understand the stage in the
same way: not simply as a space of imitation; nor as a vehicle for what Deleuze
and Guattari call “a correspondence between relations” (whereby, for example,
Richard Burbage, playing Othello, might address a Globe audience in a
that recapitulates the relations between the character Othello and his various
audiences); nor as a space of Burkean “courtship,” in which every effort at the
transcendence of social estrangement is recuperated into a parallel gesture of
ego-construction. Instead, using Othello as a model,
might propose
alternative view of the Shakespearean theater organized not through the struc
tural dichotomy of being and imitation, but through the more fluid and inde
terminate process of Deleuzian becoming. If nothing else, this fluidity and
indeterminacy
help to account for the peculiar emotional and political
charge associated with the
English popular theater both by its advocates
and its detractors, for both groups arguably find themselves responding, in dif
ferent ways, to the theater’s capacity for rendering human relations transspecif
ic, transpersonal and to this extent transhuman as well. I believe this mode of
theatrical
is particularly well represented in Othello’s final speech.

5.

Othello’s last words comprise his crowning achievement as a storyteller because
they challenge most directly the distinction between actor and character (or, in
more purely narrative terms, between subject and object of representation). In
this respect one may recall Robert Weimann’s analysis of Shakespearean Figurenposition, the spatial disposition of the actor’s body so as to “generate a
unique stage presence that establishes a special relationship between himself
and
fellow actors, the play, or the audience” (230). For Weimann, this spe
cial relationship is an outgrowth of the traditional opposition between upstage
and downstage positions (locus and plated) in the medieval theater, and it leads
to a continuum of dramatic representation that on one end (the platea) privi
leges
actor’s interaction with
audience and at the other extreme privileges
the character’s interaction with other characters. Harry Berger, Jr. has recently
revisited this distinction in order to observe that the actor, as actor, cannot
so easily scripted into an exclusive relationship with the audience, for the sim
ple reason that in his role as a dramatic character the actor is always inevitably
and simultaneously interacting both with other dramatic characters and with
other actors. As Berger asks, “Is Hamlet as Hamlet aware of his fellow actors
or of his fellow characters?” (“The Prince’s Dog” 48). The question is ultimately
unanswerable, for in Deleuzian terms actor and character deterritorialize
another, forming a theatrical parallel to the mutually sustaining relationship of
orchid-wasp to wasp-orchid. As I have argued above, this relationship is also
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refigured, on the level of character alone, through the interaction of Othello and
Desdemona.
In short, the actor threatens to disrupt the essential “standoffishness” or
“division” constitutive of Burkean rhetoric, for the actor himself is always
already subject to multiple ego-structures and multiple modes of articulation.
If, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, “the unconscious itself [is] fundamental
ly a crowd” (Thousand Plateaus 29), the actor renders this tendency toward pro
liferation particularly explicit, and with threatening implications for any unitary,
self-identified notion of character or personality. With his final words, thus,
Othello elides the roles of actor and character in a way that also forces an eli
between character and audience. “Soft you; a word or two before you go”
(5.2.338) introduces his speech with a pronoun
that points ambiva
lently to the character Lodovico, who is about to bear the wounded Iago off to
torture, and to an audience that is likewise preparing to depart the theater as the
play’s performance draws to an end, while the very next line — “I have done the
state some service” — arguably registers parity between Othello’s role as a ser
vant of the Venetian senate and the King’s Men’s role as servants of the English
crown. Having thus, in his speech’s preamble, made available an elaborate par
allelism between the roles of actor, characters, and
Othello then pro
ceeds to a series of requests, commands, and declarations that render these roles
not only parallel but inextricable and mutually sustaining.
“I pray you, in your letters, / When you shall these unlucky
relate, /
Speak of me as I am” (340-2): Othello asks Lodovico to “relate” his deeds in
“letters” that “speak” of him accurately, and the juxtaposition of contradictory
modes of discourse, one (the written) appropriate to Lodovico and another (the
spoken) more fitting to a theater audience, is arguably more than coincidence.
The operative verb “speak” reappears
line later (“Then must you speak / Of
one that lov’d not wisely but too well” [343-4]), whereas Othello can revert
a clear reliance upon the written word eight lines after that (“Set you down this”
[351]); as a reader or spectator tracks these usages from writing to speaking to
speaking and back again to writing, their aggregate effect is to superimpose
audience upon character. Moreover, in their form as commands or exhortations
dictating a particular spoken or written message, these constructions elide audi
ence with
each onlooker, recalling and relating to others the events of
Othello’s death, steps into the position prepared for him/her by the actor per
forming the role of Othello: “Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, / Nor
set down aught in malice” (342-3). Telling his own story to us, Othello antic
ipates us (and Lodovico) telling it in turn to others, in the parallel universes of
extratheatrical reality and of dramatic fiction, and we, by telling the story in our
turn, not only recapitulate and perpetuate the narrative function exemplified
Othello himself but also enact the future
demanded by the play’s own
narrative impulse.
This complicated pattern of anticipation and interdependence may also
repeat itself in Othello’s disparaging references to ethnic others: the “base
[Indian]” (or, in the Folio reading, “Judean”) who, like Othello, “threw a pearl
away / Richer than all his tribe” (347-8); and the “malignant and . . . turban’d
Turk” whom Othello recalls slaying in Aleppo (353). On
hand, these
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remarks clearly register the sense of ethnic inferiority that Othello has
by the end of his play; in dispraising the “base [Indian]” and “malignant . . .
Turk,” Othello dispraises himself. Yet this dispraise simultaneously functions
as the vehicle for an assertion of superiority; Othello rises above his base and
malignant self by repeating a gesture of punishment drawn from his own past,
and by doing so he renders the relations between actor, character, and audience
more involuted than ever. “I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog, / And
smote him — thus” (355-6): who is the actor here?
it Burbage playing the
role of Othello, or is it Othello playing the role of Othello, or is it Othello play
ing the role of the “circumcised dog” who receives punishment from Othello in
his role as Othello,
Burbage who, as Othello playing the “
dog,”
receives punishment from himself? And who is the audience? Is it the actor
playing Lodovico, or is it the Venetian senate whose judgment Othello antici
pates, or is it the Othello who anticipates and preempts that senates judgment,
or is it the Globe audience whose judgment Othello likewise anticipates and
seeks to influence or preempt through his performance — an audience that in
its judiciary capacity inevitably recapitulates the workings of the senate
which Othello’s words are also addressed?
The moral of this essay is not that any
of these notions of actor, or
character, or audience must prevail, nor is it that Othello successfully achieves a
sustainable discursive condition in which the “standoffishness” of Burkean
rhetoric is rendered void. But I would, at the least, maintain that Othello envi
sions the possibility of such a condition, and that through the startling narra
tive juxtapositions and conflations of its principal character, the play offers us a
glimpse of what such a condition might be
In the process, too, it may give
us a kind of insight into Shakespeare’s intuitive sense of the theater: of its
appeal and function, and the peculiar nature of the power it may exert over
actors and audiences alike. At
one thing is clear: Othello’s story
telling, for whatever reason, exerts a time-tested ability to manipulate his audi
tors, insisting that they become storytellers — his storytellers — in turn. It is
an insistence to which this essay, like others before it, cannot help but respond.

Notes
1. In the case of Lacan, desire exists as the unassuageable consequence of
the speaking subject’s entry into consciousness and the symbolic order. It
develops through the infant’s mirror-stage estrangement from its mother as
well as from the self-estrangement consequent upon linguistic representation,
and it provides the enduring sense of lack that linguistic utterance is designed
to repair upon immediate local levels, but which stands as the ultimately
ineradicable precondition for utterance itself. Thus, for Lacan, “Discontinuity
. . . is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phe
nomenon” (25), while the idea of a unitary consciousness develops as “a sort of
double of the organism in which this false unity is thought to reside” (26). For
Derrida, the immediate focus of différance is the formal self-estrangement of
the signifying function: the fissure that opens up in linguistic representation
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between signifier and signified, the latter of which is primordially different
from and deferred by the former, with the result that “[t]he center [of a signi
function] is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not
belong to the totality .. ., the totality has its center elsewhere” (279). The pri
ority of estrangement within both of these theories of language and conscious
ness helps to relate them to Burkean analysis.
2. For a range of noteworthy examples, see Greenblatt 222-54; Sinfield 2951; Wayne 153-79; Bates 51-60; and Hopkins 159-74.
3. See Sedgwick 35, for instance: Shakespeares “[s]onnets present a male
male love that, like the love of the Greeks, is set firmly within a structure of
institutionalized social relations that are carried out via women: marriage,
name, family, loyalty to progenitors and posterity, all depend on the youths
making a particular use of women that is not, in the abstract, seen as opposing,
denying, or detracting from his bond to the speaker.” In this context, “women
are merely the vehicles by which men breed more men,
the gratification of
other men” (33).
4. Bruce Smith is only
of many recent scholars who have noted that
“[n]o
in Shakespeare’s day would have labeled himself a ‘homosexual.’ The
term itself is a clinical,
coinage of the clinical,
nineteenth
century. ‘Bugger’ and ‘sodomite,’ the closest equivalents in early modern Eng
lish, . .. [lack] exactitude, since ‘buggery’ was also used to refer to bestiality and
‘sodomy’ could cover a variety of heterosexual acts. ... For individuals and their
self-identity this definition, or lack of definition, had enormous consequences”
(11). Thus, as Alan Bray has noted, “To talk of an individual in this period as
being or not being ‘a homosexual’ is an anachronism and ruinously misleading”
(16).
5. Carol Neely, for one, thus notes that “Iago offers to compensate” for
Othello’s loss of Desdemona “with his own love,” and that act 3, scene 3 “con
cludes with Othello’s attempt to replace his love for Desdemona with a . . .
bond with Iago” (91).
6. The relation between discourses of criminality and morbidity is perva
sive in the Renaissance, as well as being fundamentally theological in nature. In
his study of birth abnormalities, for instance, Paré claims that “most often these
monstrous and marvelous creatures proceed from the judgment of God, who
permits fathers and mothers to produce such abominations from the disorder
that they make in copulation, like brutish beasts, in which their appetite guides
them, without respecting the time, or other laws ordained
God and Nature”
(5). Thus Paré’s medical abnormalities serve to punish criminality, just as
Coke’s laws serve to punish “unnatural” and “sinful” behavior: “Buggery is a
detestable and abominable sin . . . against the ordinance of the Creator and
order of nature” (Coke sig. I3v).
7.
See Foucault passim, especially 53-73.
8. Lisa Hopkins, in particular,
that Iago’s approach to narrative rep
resentation is “far more sophisticated” than Othello’s (168), which figures “nar
ration [as] a transparent mode” (163). Yet Hopkins also rightly observes that
Iago “is a poorer narrator and stager than Othello” (168), and the present essay
seeks to account for Othello’s narrative gift as something other than a lack of
sophistication.
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9. For Adelman, “Othello’s black skin” comes, through the process of pro
jection, to serve as “the container for [Iago’s] own interior blackness” (130):
“Insofar as Iago can make Othello
his own blackness as a contami
nation . . . , he succeeds in emptying himself out into Othello” (144).
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